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I.  WHAT IS AN INSTITUTION? 
Webster’s Dictionary defines institution as “an established order, principle, 
law or usage as an element of organised society or of civilisation”. There are other 
interpretations of this term, depending upon the context for which the term is needed. 
For the purposes of the theme of this 19th Annual General Meeting of the Pakistan 
Society of Development Economists (PSDE), “Institutional Change, Growth and 
Poverty”, I find this well-crafted Webster Dictionary definition to be appropriate and 
adequate. 
There is now strong recognition that institutional reforms are necessary to 
sustain rapid growth and poverty reduction in developing countries. However, it is 
first necessary to identify and specify what these institutional reforms are. A number 
of systematic efforts to define institutions in an analytical context have been 
undertaken. For example, the World Development Report (WDR) 2002 of the World 
Bank focused on “Building Institutions for Markets” as the core theme of the report.
1 
There has been emphasis on aspects of institutions in other WDRs as well, including 
in the WDR 1997 on the Role of the State,
2 the WDR 2003 on Environment,
3 and the 
most recent WDR 2004 on Service Delivery.
4  Each of the WDRs builds on the 
analysis of earlier WDRs and provides analysis of the institutional context of the 
development challenge in concrete terms to make associated reforms implementable. 
This is indeed a laudable effort and provides a fairly rich analytical base over which 
one can build on to move the institutional reform agenda forward. 
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For the purposes of this paper, I will focus on one core institution, using the 
broad definition provided by the Webster Dictionary as noted above. I identify this 
institution as the Government Budget and the theme of the paper is how Budgetary 
reforms can support growth and poverty reduction in Pakistan. 
It is fair to ask in what sense is the Budget an Institution? It is easy to see that 
the government Budget is probably the most powerful established order, principle or 
law that affects the functioning of the modern society. Budget provides the 
government legal authority to tax earnings of a private citizen. Budgetary principles 
and laws influence the functioning of the markets in ways that no other single 
institution can possibly do in today’s modern economy. Formulation of the Budget 
reflects the multitude of political interests and coalition that underlie the political 
governance of a society. Having a voice in Budget formulation and implementation 
is perhaps the most effective way of giving voice to the civil society to affect its 
well-being. 
The influence of the Budget on growth and poverty reduction is well 
recognised. This can happen through a variety of ways. For example, budgetary 
decisions through taxation, borrowing and spending affect incentives for business 
and household decisions in such key areas as savings, investments, exports and 
imports that have implications for employment and growth. Budgetary spending can 
also affect poverty through the direct provision or funding of core services and 
targeted poverty reduction programmes. There is a rich body of empirical research 
that one can draw upon to illustrate the role of the Budget in affecting growth and 
poverty reduction. We will return to this subject later in the paper. 
Against the backdrop of this introduction, the remainder of the paper is 
organised as follows. In Section II, I develop a brief analytical framework that shows 
the different institutional dimensions of the Budget and how they need to be 
reformed to ensure that the Budget is indeed supportive of higher economic growth 
and poverty reduction. In Section III, I apply this framework to the specific context 
of Pakistan. Finally in Section IV, I provide some concluding remarks. 
 
II. CORE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE BUDGET: 
AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The Budget inherently is a political instrument and is used as such. Therefore, 
formulating and implementing a budget is essentially the outcome of the interplay of 
coalition of a number of political and social interest groups. “The budget is the 
critical link on the long route of accountability connecting citizens to providers 
through politicians and policy-makers”, notes the WDR 2004 (p. 181). Consequently, 
securing a good budget, which I define as a budget that minimises the disincentive 
effect of taxation and borrowing while ensuring that resources thus mobilised are 
spent for promoting growth and reducing poverty, will require that the underlying 
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requires attention to a number of core institutional aspects that are critical for 
ensuring that the budget indeed contributes to the desired outcomes. 
For analytical purposes, these core institutional dimensions can be described 
as follows: 
  •  budget deficit and debt management; 
  • taxation  management; 
  • managing  public  spending; 
  •  allocating responsibility by levels of government; 
  •  predictability and transparency of the budget;  
  •  expenditure tracking and monitoring; 
  • public  accounts. 
How are these institutional components related to each other and how do they 
work to lead to good or bad budget outcomes? 
Budget Deficit and Debt Management. Budget deficit and public debt are 
obviously inter-related. The deficit outturn and associated financing decisions can 
have major effects on growth and poverty reduction. For example, the budget deficits 
were insignificantly small or in surplus in the 1990s among the best-performing 
countries but averaged over 10 percent of GDP among the worst-performing 
countries [WDR (2002)]. Sustained large budget deficits can easily lead to debt 
explosion and economic decline, causing tremendous political, economic and social 
difficulties. The world today is replete with such examples, including the well-
known HIPC (highly indebted poor countries) phenomenon. 
Despite well-known adverse consequences of prolonged large fiscal deficits, 
many countries are only too willing to let this happen. Why? And what can be done 
to address this problem? The level of deficit is a political decision and politicians are 
often happy to leave the problem alone if they can get away with it (i.e., they do not 
face a crisis situation) because correcting these deficits are politically painful (higher 
taxation and or spending cutbacks are both unpalatable to politicians because they 
tend to create adverse political reactions in the short run while benefits normally 
occur in the longer term). So, while the obvious solution to lower deficit is to raise 
revenues and restrain spending, these reforms are not easy to obtain. However, a 
number of institutional arrangements related to Budget management can help. These 
include: a strong finance ministry with authority to resist budgetary amendments; 
fiscal responsibility bills; and restriction on borrowing at lower levels of 
government. Evidence suggests that all these rules and regulations if used well can 
have a positive impact in limiting budget deficits [WDR (2002)]. 
Taxation Management. The budget deficit and public debt in turn are the 
results of two other related institutional aspects of the budget: taxation and spending 
decisions. Taxation is inherently unpopular and has been so in all societies and in all 
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management of taxation brings out tremendous political challenges of vested interest 
of all types, especially in developing countries where tax administration is very 
weak. Elite capture and corruption in many developing countries have often lead to 
low tax collection as well as reliance on inefficient taxes that distort resource 
allocation. The outcome often is negative impact on growth and equity. For example, 
except in Sri Lanka, on average annual total tax collection in the South Asia Region 
(SAR) is not only quite low, ranging between 9 percent of GDP to 13 percent of 
GDP, income tax compliance is only between 6-16 percent [Ahmed (2002)].
5  Such 
low income tax compliance is reflective of the political power of the elites and 
vested interests. Addressing this requires among other things bringing the relevant 
information out to the general public in order to have an important debate how to 
solve the following problem of the collective: raising sufficient revenue in an 
equitable and efficient way to pay for public good provision. Demonstrating 
compliance with tax laws by the politicians and elites will be helpful. Also, the 
government’s ability to offer quality public services to citizen’s is a critical 
determinant of tax compliance. 
On the institutional front, the low income tax compliance is a reflection of 
poor tax administration. International evidence suggests that establishing an 
autonomous tax agency can help improve tax administration [WDR (2002)]. 
However, simply declaring a tax administration as autonomous on paper will not 
work. Along with strong political commitment that backs up the working of this 
agency by withdrawing protection of the offenders and letting the penalty system 
work, partnership with the business community to support an efficient and equitable 
tax agency will be necessary. 
Managing Public Spending. Spending decisions are equally political in 
nature. Elite and vested interest capture are common phenomenon.  Spending capture 
can reflect interests of powerful specific institutions such as the military (defense 
spending), the civil service (levels of employment and wage and pensions bills), 
public enterprises (levels of subsidy), and farmers (subsidy on power, water, food 
procurement). Equally worrisome, public spending is often constrained by fixed 
commitments due to poor fiscal management of past governments (e.g. interest 
payments on public debt). Consequently, it is often the case that public spending for 
supporting growth (e.g. infrastructure) and human development (health, education, 
water supply) are a relatively a small share of total spending. For example, in SAR 
countries, on average a dollar of public spending is distributed as follows: 20 cents 
goes to interest payments, 11 cents to defense, 16 cents to upkeep of civil servants 
and 13 cents for largely untargeted subsidy payments. Only the remaining 40 cents 
goes for basic infrastructure and human development [Ahmed (2002)]. Recognising 
the importance of managing public spending for service delivery for the poor, the 
 
5Even for Sri Lanka, the average tax collection per annum (17 percent of GDP) is low relative to 
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WDR 2004 notes as follows: “When services fail poor people, a good place to start 
looking for the underlying problem is almost always how the government spends 
money. If politicians and policy-makers spend more than they can sustain, services 
deteriorate. If budgets are misallocated, basic services remain underfunded and 
frontline providers are handicapped. And if funds are misappropriated, service 
quality quantity and access suffer” (p. 181). So, securing an efficient and equitable 
tax system as well as ensuring that public spending is channeled to areas that support 
growth and poverty reduction are major institutional challenges in most developing 
economies. 
Allocating Responsibility by Levels of Government. The effectiveness of 
public spending in terms of contribution to growth and poverty reduction outcomes is 
in many instances limited by poor service delivery. It is not just the level of funding but 
how the money is used to provide service which matter. Service delivery weakness of 
the public sector often result from its highly centralised structure, leading to disconnect 
between providers and beneficiaries and poor accountability. So, a proper allocation of 
responsibility for budget formulation, financing and implementation by appropriate 
levels of government is a key institutional challenge for good Budget management. 
However, as the WDR 2004 notes, decentralisation by itself cannot be a panacea for 
resolving public sector service delivery problems. Successful decentralisation should 
be based on the key principles of accountability, transparency (to the public) and clear 
lines of responsibility in revenue and expenditure assignment. So, making 
decentralisation deliver the intended outcomes requires a careful design of the 
intergovernmental fiscal relations, getting the administrative structure of local 
governments in place, developing local government capacities, establishing clear 
accountability mechanisms and ensuring transparency at all levels. 
Predictability and Transparency of the Budget. Budget decisions are 
typically carried out on an annual cycle (known as fiscal year) whereas outcomes 
require longer-term commitments. Fluctuations in revenues and uncertainties about 
availability of foreign aid on an annual cycle along with lumpiness of many public 
capital spending means considerable uncertainty in matching resource needs to 
revenues on a yearly basis. Yearly budgetary fluctuations can cause major 
difficulties in meeting financial commitments or completing projects efficiently and 
on time. Often, the budget is based on incomplete or inadequate information, 
especially at the sectoral expenditure level, either because of poor planning or 
because line ministries hide true costs to get project approvals. These in turn can 
have serious adverse effects on efficient use of public resources. One possible option 
to improve the transparency and predictability of the budget is the use of medium-
term budgetary framework (MTBF). These are now becoming increasingly popular 
in developing countries. A well-designed MTBF can be a powerful instrument for 
improved budgetary management, provided adequate capacity is in place including 
efforts to improve the information base. Sadiq Ahmed  354
Expenditure Tracking and Monitoring. While proper allocation of 
budgetary responsibility by levels of government can be very helpful in establishing 
better accountability, it is still important to know how public resources are actually 
been spent at all levels of government. This information is necessary not only to 
make midway corrections as necessary but also to assure both public officials and 
citizens that money is actually being spent on the intended purpose. Also, good 
analysis of the impact of public spending on economic outcomes is needed. Both 
these information can be very powerful in giving citizens a voice when there are 
concerns about the effectiveness of public spending. 
Public Accounts. Finally, proper audit of the budget to account for all 
revenues mobilised and all monies spent is a essential to ensure financial discipline 
and accountability, which are critical for the overall effectiveness of the Budget. 
Without independent audits that are made available to the public and a system of 
diligent follow up to the reservations expressed in the audit report, there is a serious 
risk that public resources will be wasted either through corruption or through 
inefficiency or both. Poor performing budgets are often a reflection of the lack of 
institutional arrangements for ensuring the formal accountability for public funds. 
 
III. BUDGET’S EFFECTS ON GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUCTION 
IN PAKISTAN: THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Much has been written about Pakistan’s development performance, its 
achievements and challenges. Recent work among others includes those of Ahmed 
(2002a), Hussain (1999) and Hasan (1998). The evidence shows that Pakistan made 
good progress in reducing poverty in the 1970s and 1980s, but poverty increased in 
the 1990s (see Figures 1 and 2).
6  The achievements in terms of progress with human 
development is even more worrisome, lagging behind those of other countries with 
similar per capita incomes in most areas (Figure 3). This has led analysts to diagnose  
 
6For a detailed analysis of Pakistan’s poverty, see World Bank (2002b). 
 










Pakistan as suffering from a serious “Social Gap”, defined as the difference between 
the actual social indicators and predicted social indicators if Pakistan had performed 
similarly as the average for comparable per capita income countries.   The growth 
outcomes have depicted a pattern similar to poverty trends: rapid growth in the 
1970s and 1980s, then declining significantly in the 1990s (Figure 4). As well, 
growth in the 1990s was more volatile than in the earlier two decades due to 
external shocks including the effects of drought. The adverse effects of the drought 
have been particularly severe for the rural poor. 
 
1This term was coined by Easterly (2001) and the analysis of the social gap is contained in that paper. See 
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These development outcomes are the consequences of the interaction of a large 
number of policy and institutional variables. The works cited above and other research 
analyse these  factors  in  detail.  For the purposes of this paper I focus upon the role of 
the government budget in explaining these outcomes. By doing so, the objective is not 
to belittle the importance of the whole range of other variables, but instead to show the 
importance of budgetary reforms for supporting growth and poverty reduction in 
Pakistan. To do this, I follow the framework presented in Section II above. 
Fiscal Deficits and Debt. Few would doubt that poor fiscal management has 
been at the heart of Pakistan’s development constraints. The effects of poor fiscal 
management became particularly evident in the 1990s when Pakistan came to the 
verge of a debt default that was averted with only a great deal of effort and from 
strong support from the International Financial Institutions.
7  What is the genesis of 
poor fiscal management and what were its broad consequences? 
Pakistan’s fiscal crisis of the 1990s had its roots in poor fiscal management in 
the 1970s and 1980s. On average, Pakistan ran fiscal deficit of about 7.5 percent per 
annum between 1972 and 1992. Initially, a rapid pace of growth, fueled in part by 
the fiscal stimulus, and negative real foreign interest rates, allowed debt to GDP ratio 
to fall and the interest cost of deficits to stay low [Ahmed (1994)]. Thus, debt to 
 
7By December 1998, as a result of the combined effects of G-7 sanctions and drying up of private 
capital flows, Pakistan’s reserves plunged to below $200 million, leading to the prospects of a debt default 
to its preferred creditors. This was avoided through a massive effort by the then economic team to 
implement a strong reform programme with support from the World Bank, ADB, and IMF, leading to bop 
assistance of close to a billion dollars that helped Pakistan shore up its fragile reserves position while 
meeting its obligations to preferred creditors. 
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GDP ratio actually fell from 79 percent in 1973 to 50 percent in 1981. The interest 
cost of large fiscal deficits was also contained at around 2 percent of GDP. But this 
expansionary fiscal policy stance was not adjusted even as international and 
domestic interest rates started to rise in real terms. Adjustments in exchange rate 
needed to boost exports also contributed to an increase in the debt to GDP ratio. 
Overall, the debt to GDP ratio started climbing rapidly in the 1980s, even though 
continued fiscal stimulus supported rapid growth in the 6 percent per annum range. 
Consequently, by 1990, debt to GDP ratio had reached 84 percent. Importantly, the 
interest cost of debt soared to 5.5 percent of GDP. 
The rising interest cost and growing debt to GDP ratio was not accompanied 
by commensurate increase in debt servicing capacity, either in terms of export 
earnings or in tax revenues [Ahmed (2002a)]. The budgetary problem became 
particularly acute as the share of interest cost in total spending and total revenues 
rose rapidly during the 1990s, leaving an increasingly lower share of resources for 
financing Pakistan’s development needs (see Figure 5). It became increasingly clear 
to the policy-makers and developments partners that without fiscal adjustment, the 
country’s economic prospects were dim. This arguably became Pakistan’s most 







Fig. 5. Trends in Interest Spending. 
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negotiated and abandoned with no programme being completed. These 
negotiations involved as many as 6 governments and 8 Finance Ministers. 
What was the underlying constraint? Quite apart from difficulties due to poor 
governance, the basic problem was that the required magnitude of adjustment was 
quite difficult for any political government to handle. Fiscal stimulus in the 1970s 
and 1980s supported a rapid pace of growth that was no longer sustainable in the 
1990s. Reducing fiscal deficits from the 9-10 percent level to the 3-4 percent 
sustainable level entailed a massive amount of belt tightening (5-6 percent of GDP). 
At the same time, rising real interest rates made the challenge even more difficult. 
Thus, for example, development spending in real terms fell by 40 percent over 1991-
2001 and its share in total spending fell from 25 percent to only 13 percent [World 
Bank (2003)]. So, the combined effects of the fiscal crunch and rising interest rates 
dampened reduced investor confidence and adversely affected economic growth, 
creating income and employment problems. These difficulties were aggravated by 
rising oil prices and slow down in the expansion of remittance inflows. The result 
was political resistance to adjustment efforts, contributing to a stop-go pattern of 
fiscal adjustment (Figure 6).  Even so, by 1999, the fiscal deficit had come down to 
5.6 percent of GDP, falling from 9 percent in 1991. Importantly, the primary balance 
improved sharply from 4.5 percent in the late 1980s to a surplus of 1.2 percent in 
1999 [World Bank (2003)]. 
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Given this depth of the fiscal adjustment and the associated cuts in public 
investment, it is hardly surprising that the growth rate plummeted from over 6 
percent per annum in the 1980s to around 4 percent in the 1990s. Clearly, this 
substantial fiscal adjustment was achieved at the cost of growth. While part of the 
adjustment cost was probably unavoidable due to the massive scale of the adjustment 
effort, a better adjustment programme that put more emphasis on resource 
mobilisation, protecting core non-interest, non-defense public spending, and finding 
other ways to reduce the interest cost of the deficits (such as reducing high-cost 
government sponsored saving schemes) would have helped avoid the severity of the 
adjustment cost. Indeed, that was the advice given by the IFIs. It was not 
implemented due to political factors [Ahmed (2002)]. 
Circumstances changed quite positively during 2000-2003. First, a reform 
minded military government came to power in October 1999. The government has 
the credit of sticking to a full 3-year IMF programme. Second, there was a very 
favourable round of Paris Club debt rescheduling negotiations. Third, there has been 
a substantial increase in remittance inflows. And fourth, interest rates came down 
quite sharply, both internationally and domestically, while the exchange rate 
stabilised. The combined effects of these factors was a further consolidation in the 
fiscal deficit and a sharp decrease in the fiscal cost of debt. The fiscal space thus 
created has provided the basis for some expansion of critical spending in social 
sectors, on poverty programmes and on key infrastructure [World Bank (2003)]. 
Although, there is still a way to go to further consolidate the fiscal progress and 
address the critical development needs to spur growth and reduce poverty, the gain in 
fiscal space has been a major adjustment achievement. The outcomes are positive in 
terms of not only better macroeconomic balances, but also there is some evidence of 
a turnaround in investment and growth [World Bank (2003)]. Efforts are also 
underway to strengthen Public Debt Management. A Debt Coordination Office has 
been set up to strengthen the link between fiscal policy and debt management and to 
monitor the implementation of the government’s Debt Reduction and Management 
Strategy. Very recently, a Fiscal Responsibility Bill and Debt Limitation Law has 
been presented to the Parliament. The Law requires reducing the revenue deficit to 
zero by June 30, 2008 and maintaining a surplus thereafter, and reducing total debt to 
60 percent of GDP or lower by June 2013. 
Tax Management. While fiscal policy is rightly considered as Pakistan’s 
Achilles Heel of development strategy, one key underlying constraint is tax 
management. This is easy to see from Figure 7 that shows the path of public sector 
resource mobilisation over the 1975-2002 period, broken down by tax revenue, 
income tax revenue and non-tax revenue. Two striking results are: First, tax as a 
share of GDP, has hardly shown any upward flexibility, staying flat at around 12-13 
percent of GDP, not withstanding the frequent efforts to address this challenge 
including the 10 IMF programmes. Second, non-tax revenue, which includes Sadiq Ahmed  360
proceeds from public services including distribution of petroleum products and profit 
transfers from the Central Bank operations, grew significantly between 1975–90, 
growing to 6 percent of GDP in 1990, but then declined to around 4 percent of GDP 
in the 1990s. The fluctuations in non-tax revenue in the 1990s mainly reflect the 
fluctuations in profit transfers from the Central Bank operations and from sale of 
petroleum. Third, income tax revenue has not only been very low but actually 
declined as a share of GDP in the 1980s. The tax debacle is the direct manifestation 
of a major institutional problem in Pakistan—poor tax management. 
The problem of tax management has two inter-related dimensions. One is the 
tax structure, and the second is tax administration. Pakistan’s tax structure has 
traditionally been characterised by the dominance of indirect taxes—international 
trade taxes, domestic sales taxes and excise duties. As noted above, direct taxes, such 
as income tax and tax on wealth, has been a low proportion of total tax revenue. As 
Figures 7 and 8 show, the share of income tax in total tax barely improved until the 
1990s. Quite apart from the issues of equity and tax buoyancy, this inefficient tax 
structure has distorted incentives for investment and exports, thereby weakening the 
growth impact of the budget. Within the indirect tax category, however, there has 
been some recent progress. Importantly, the share of international trade taxes has 
come  down  sharply from 30 percent in 1995 to 16 percent in 1999 and to 11 percent 
in 2002. As well, very recently, efforts are underway to introduce a broad based sales 
tax as a step towards establishing a value-added tax. Finally, some progress has been 
made in increasing revenues from income taxes in the 1990s, growing from 2 percent 
of GDP in 1990 to 3.4 percent in 1999 and to 4.0 percent in 2002. 
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Regarding tax administration, the worst aspects of poor political governance 
have dominated tax mobilisation effort. The reasons for the low income tax effort in 
Pakistan is first that the tax base is very low because a large segment of the 
economic activity base has been out of the tax loop either by law (agriculture) or 
because of the lack of documentation (the grey economy). A second reason is the 
weak administrative capacity and corruption of the tax administrative machinery. A 
third and related reason is the wilful non-compliance by the elite class based on 
political patronage. 
The legal exemption of agriculture from the tax base is a reflection of the 
power and authority of the land-owning class in the Pakistani politics. World around, 
including Pakistan, feudalism is well-known to heavily influence economic and 
social decision making in view of its tremendous political clout. So, it is little 
wonder that two areas where progress has basically stalled in Pakistan concerns 
taxation of agricultural income and land reforms. Responding to donor pressures, 
weak attempts to introduce some kind of agricultural income tax happened in the 
1990s. Little progress in implementation happened. In 2000 July, all provinces 
finally enacted the agricultural income tax. Despite this, however, the collection 
effort remains weak. 
Regarding inadequate documentation and the gray economy, the main 
political consideration has been the street power of the large number of traders in 
Pakistan. Again, responding to donor pressure, numerous efforts were made in the 
1990s to bring the trading community in the tax net through proper documentation 
and record keeping. However, little progress was achieved. Finally, though, in late 
2000 a breakthrough was achieved by the military government in enforcing the 
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documentation process for the trading community. Sustaining and expanding this 
effort remains a major challenge. 
Regarding low tax compliance, this is partly explained by poor tax 
administration, but also by the political patronage of the elite-type willful tax 
defaulters by the ruling class. Non-compliance with tax obligation is especially a 
problem with the politicians, often taking advantage of the exemption granted to 
income from agriculture. Poor tax administration simply makes it that much 
more convenient. Armed with inadequate record keeping, including lack of 
computerisation, tax officials have often entered into private deals to under-
report income and collect low income taxes. Reform efforts to improve tax 
administration figured prominently in all IMF programmes negotiated in the 
1990s. By and large, these efforts were thwarted by the vested interest, 
especially by the politicians. 
Once again, it is to the credit of the 1999 military government that a major 
reform of the tax administration system was initiated. A comprehensive tax 
administration reform proposal was prepared in early 2001
8 [Pakistan (2001)]. 
Implementation of these reforms, however, has been slow. While good progress has 
been made in a number of areas including establishment of a stronger tax 
administration, progress towards a generalised sales tax, and streamlining of income 
taxes, the reforms did not go to the full length of radical reforms proposed by the 
Commission, especially concerning establishing a truly autonomous tax department. 
Managing Public Spending. Along with high fiscal deficits, Pakistan’s 
spending priorities has also been of major concern. In addition to interest cost of 
growing debt that has progressively absorbed a higher share of a stagnant revenue 
base, the largest other spending item has been spending on defense. So, between 
interest cost and defense, on average they absorbed about 70 percent of total 
revenues leaving very little for other needs including for social sector and 
infrastructure.  A particularly striking story on how unhelpful the budget has been for 
poverty reduction is to look at the ratio of military spending to spending on health 
and education. Historically, spending priorities have been heavily biased in favour of 
defense spending and against health and education spending (see Figure 9). For   
example, even in the late eighties, the ratio of military spending to health and 
education spending was 250 percent, possibly the highest in the world. The bias 
against health and education spending improved very slowly in the 1990s. 
A gradual improving trend emerged in the early 1991 following the adoption 
of the Social Action Programme, largely under the pressure of the donor community. 
As a result, this ratio improved as defense spending was curtailed and health and 
education spending was increased. In terms of levels, the gradual improvement 
allowed Pakistan’s social spending to recover from a low of below 2 percent of GDP 
in  1980  to  3.0 percent  of  GDP  in 1999. Since then there has been some decline in  
 




heath and education spending as a share of GDP, but other spending on poverty 
programmes has increased including on water, sanitation, and basic infrastructure as 
a part of implementation of the I-PRSP. On health and education, the government is 
rightly focusing attention on improving service delivery to improve quality of public 
spending. Yet, while continuing to focus on quality improvements, the recent decline 
in spending on health and education needs to be reversed soon and expanded to meet 
the tremendous financing needs to address Pakistan’s social gap. 
In the face of this poor historical spending pattern, the fiscal adjustment needs of 
the 1990s created further difficulties. Since resource mobilisation effort did not achieve 
much success, the bulk of the fiscal adjustment burden fell on public spending, which 
declined from 26 percent of GDP in 1975 to only 22 percent in 1999 and then increased 
only marginally over the 2000-2002 period in response to improved fiscal space. As 
noted earlier, the effects of the fiscal crunch on economic growth was predictably 
negative. Clearly, while fiscal stimulus of the 1970s and 1980s fueled economic growth 
in these two decades, such fiscal stimulus was unsustainable [Ahmed (1994)]. The budget 
tightening in the 1990s that was necessary to avoid financial bankruptcy created 
difficulties for economic growth in the 1990. The creation of fiscal space in the decade of 
the 2000 will be essential to support essential public spending in infrastructure and 
Operation and Maintenance (O&M) to restore the growth momentum. Equally important, 
public spending on social sectors and other poverty programmes will be necessary to 
reduce poverty in this decade. So, the recent progress with creation of fiscal space is a 
welcome development [World Bank (2003)]. 
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Allocating Responsibility by Levels of Government. While by Constitution 
Pakistan is a federation comprising of 4 provinces and two federally administered 
territories, fiscally the country has been heavily centralised. The 1973 Constitution 
has well identified areas of expenditure responsibilities, but commensurate 
distribution of revenue assignments has been a serious problem [Ahmed and Shah 
(1995)]. Bulk of the revenues are collected at the federal government level and then 
allocated to the Provinces by means of the periodic awards of the National Finance 
Commission. Thus, even in 2002, Federal revenues were 95 percent of total 
revenues, staying roughly unchanged since 1975. Regarding local governments, 
under the 1973 Constitution, these are the responsibility of the provincial 
governments. The experience with local governments has been quite dismal with 
little or no progress until the military government took over in 1999. The military 
government initiated a major initiative to devolve responsibilities to elected local 
bodies. So, a major change happened in 2001 when local body elections were held 
and elected district governments came into power with the mayor as the head of 
these governments. However, while these elected local governments brought in a 
major institutional change, enabling these governments with administrative 
capacities and financial autonomy remains major challenges. 
What has been the outcome of this heavily centralised administration for 
development performance? While there are some clear advantages in terms of 
coordination of macroeconomic policy including debt management, the biggest 
disadvantage has been the delivery of public services. Even though the jury is out on 
the international evidence on the role of decentralised governments in service 
delivery [World Development Report (2004)], it is fair to conclude that Pakistan’s 
heavily centralised system of service delivery has not worked. This is perhaps best 
illustrated through the experience with delivery of basic social services (education, 
health, water supply). 
While low budget spending has been a major constraint to human development 
in Pakistan and partly explain the social gap in Pakistan, the effectiveness of this 
spending in achieving desired outcomes is even more worrisome. Prodded by donors 
for inadequate attention to human development, in 1991 Pakistan launched an 
ambitious Social Action Plan (SAP) aimed at correcting the social gap, especially to 
address the substantial anti-female bias. The effort did lead to some significant increase 
in public spending on social sectors, but the performance in terms of human 
development outcomes has been disappointing [Ahmed (2002); World Bank (2002a) 
and World Bank (2002b)].  What went wrong? While no doubt the additional resources 
made available was a welcome move, the reason it did not achieve tremendous success 
in term of human development outcomes was because of poor governance, partly due 
to the heavily centralised system of service delivery. Among the problems included: (i) 
political interference in the selection of schools and health care sites; (ii) political 
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influence rather than merit in the location and transfer of staff; (iv) serious problems in 
procurement of goods and services related to these services; (v) abandoned and 
unfinished buildings; diversion of school and health facilities for other uses, including 
for private gains; (vi) ghost and absentee staff in school and other public facilities; (vii) 
severe imbalance between spending on staff and materials; and (viii) frequent 
problems with the timely release of funds from the centralised federal and provincial 
ministries. 
The centralised delivery system meant there was very little interaction 
between the authorities in the Federal and Provincial capitals, who were responsible 
for major decisions including financing, procurement and programme 
implementation, and those who were at the receiving end of the service provision 
chain at the district and village levels. There was no system of accountability due to 
the disconnect between decision makers, providers and beneficiaries. The 
beneficiaries lacked both a participation in decision making as well as a voice to 
influence decisions indirectly. So, when teachers or doctors did not show up for 
work, when school buildings or health clinics were left half completed, and when 
salaries were drawn by representatives of ghost teachers or heath care workers, there 
was little effective follow-up to correct these problems. 
To remedy this problem, a major initiative was launched in 2001 to restructure 
the government by devolving authority to elected local governments [Pakistan 
(2001)]. The initiative involves creating full-fledged district and municipal 
governments having legislative and financial powers. The key objective is to bring 
government closer to the people and therefore getting communities better integrated 
with the government. Devolution is seen as an effective way of giving the right 
incentives to all relevant parties to ensure good provision of public services. Thus, 
the expectation is that local governments will be influenced by the beneficiaries to 
ensure that providers deliver good services. So, the hope is that devolution would 
improve decision making and government accountability for provision of public 
services by establishing better connectivity of service providers and beneficiaries. 
Initial evidence regarding greater community oversight happening at local 
level and leading to better service outcomes is encouraging. For example, many 
school management committees have been established and they have had 
considerable success in reducing the cost of school construction. School committees 
are also having a positive impact on teacher attendance through surprise visits and 
follow-up. Although such committees could also function under a centralised 
administration, the fact that these have only emerged now under the local 
government umbrella is a positive development. 
Despite this initial progress, there is still a long way to go on the devolution 
front. Local governments do not yet have full control over the staff and finances of 
devolved departments. Capacities of these governments are very limited and 
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devolution has happened, in particular regarding revenue assignments or improved 
transfer arrangements. Getting the inter-government fiscal assignments sorted out 
efficiently remains a major challenge. 
Predictability and Transparency of the Budget. The budgetary process in 
Pakistan suffers from a number of weaknesses that reduce the effectiveness of the 
budget. These include: 
  •  lack of strategic focus and clarity on sectoral priorities; 
  •  inadequate information on the cost of policies, programmes, and services; 
  •  short-term horizon for budget decision making that fails to account for the 
long-term costs and benefits; 
  •  an artificial separation of development and recurrent budgets, weakening the 
integrated, strategic content of the budget; and 
  •  end of year spending incentives that reduce the efficiency of spending. 
The presence of these drawbacks has typically meant inefficient spending 
decisions. For example, the separation of development and recurrent spending has 
meant inadequate attention to the recurrent cost implications of capital spending. 
Indeed, operation and maintenance (O&M) has typically tended to be short-circuited 
causing low returns from capital spending. Lack of good costing analysis of public 
programmes and policies has similarly meant inappropriate or inadequate funding of 
many programmes, leading to poor efficiency of these programmes. Many public 
programmes are based on political expediency rather than based on a careful analysis 
and choice of competing priorities, again contributing to low returns from such 
spending. One well-known example of this is the funding of MNA/MPA (members of 
national and provincial assemblies) sponsored schemes practiced by all governments 
since the early 1990s, whereby funds were allocated to members of national/provincial 
assemblies for development activities in their constituencies. Experience showed 
mostly abusive use of these funds with little development impact. 
In response to these weaknesses, the government recently has taken a number 
of initiatives to improve planning and budgeting. The strategic content of the budget 
is being strengthened by linking the budget to the implementation of the 
government’s Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS). Efforts have been initiated to 
improve the costing of the various poverty programmes with a medium-term focus. 
In this regard, work is now underway to establish a comprehensive and detailed 
Medium-Term Budgetary Framework (MTBF) with the help of technical assistance 
from the United Kingdom. These are important positive steps, but there is a long way 
to go. Among the issues that need more effort and resolution include: assigning clear 
responsibilities between different levels of governments and line ministries in the 
formulation of the MTBF; capacity to do detailed costing of programmes and 
policies; establishing sectoral and programme priorities; setting realistic programme Budgetary Reform, Growth, and Poverty  367
goals and targets; and strengthening the relationship between the PRS and the annual 
budgets. 
Expenditure Tracking and Monitoring.  One key factor underlying the low 
effectiveness of public expenditure in Pakistan has been a dysfunctional expenditure 
monitoring system. The traditional monitoring emphasis has been on spending of 
budgetary allocations rather than on outcomes. Thus, the success of budget 
implementation is judged on the basis of how closely actual spending matched the 
allocated budget. The tracking of expenditure has also been constrained by 
inadequate attention to data quality and timeliness. 
Very recently, as a part of the PRS, an effort is now underway to establish a 
fairly detailed mechanism to monitor poverty-related expenditure, along with their 
intermediate indicators and outcomes, in relation to the specific human development 
and poverty targets in the PRS. This mechanism, when fully functional, can provide 
a powerful analytical tool to assess the effectiveness of public spending in achieving 
stated outcomes. The success, however, requires a long-term effort to increase 
monitoring and evaluation capacity and strengthen the underlying data base in terms 
of quality, comprehensiveness and timeliness at the district level and moving 
upwards. 
Public Accounts. Although on paper Pakistan has a reasonably sound 
financial accountability set up, in practice weak financial accountability has been a 
fundamental institutional constraint on public spending [World Bank (2002c); World 
Bank (2003b)].  Major concerns include: 
  •  ineffective parliamentary and executive control of the budgetary spending—
audit reports on annual accounts are heavily qualified and accounts of 
different levels of government do not currently meet the expectations of the 
Constitution and associated laws and regulations; for example, the audit 
reports focus only on irregularities in individual transactions without 
sufficient attention to significance and systematic weaknesses of financial 
management system. Similarly, the legislative oversight of the accountability 
system is weak. The Public Accounts Committee meets only infrequently 
and lacks the expertise to undertake proper review. Importantly, follow-up to 
audit findings and PAC recommendations is very poor; 
  •  the accountability of the executive is not sufficiently supported by 
information that would enable it to become focused on results and outcomes; 
  •  the separation of audit and accounts took a long time to come; even now the 
process is yet to be completed. For example, the Auditor General continues 
to exercise control over both audit and accounts staff; 
  • financial management capacity at the provincial level is uneven and almost 
non-existent at the district level; 
  • although a system of penalties exist, these sanctions and associated Sadiq Ahmed  368
implementation is inordinately cumbersome and lengthy; 
  •  the quality of audit suffers both from quality and timeliness of data as well as 
low staffing quality. 
The government has recently embarked on a comprehensive reform 
programme to restructure its financial management system. Significant financial 
autonomy and responsibility has been devolved to the line ministries through the 
introduction of a New System of Financial Control and Budgeting. This has been 
accompanied by imposition of a hard budget constraint through strict expenditure 
ceilings. The spending agencies are accountable for ensure financial discipline 
including timely reconciliation of financial data. The government has accepted a 
review of fiscal reporting and transparency under the IMF’s Code of Good Practices 
on Fiscal Transparency. Consolidated fiscal accounts are posted on the Finance 
Ministry’s website on a quarterly basis. The federal and provincial PACs have been 
made more effective and the backlog of audit reports has been significantly reduced. 
In one Province (NWFP), the findings of the PAC have been made available to the 
public via timely press releases. 
These are positive steps forward. Further actions are needed to strengthen 
financial management, especially at the provincial and district levels. Capacities are 
very weak at these lower tiers of government and a long-term effort is needed. The 
system of internal controls requires strengthening; proper accounting and 
management of contingent liabilities at all levels of government remain to be 
addressed; quarterly and annual financial reports of all levels of governments need to 
be published; the capacities of PACs require strengthening; and follow-up to audit 
reports need more attention. 
 
IV.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Management of the government budget has been a major challenge in 
Pakistan. Fiscal expansion fueled rapid growth during 1970s and 1980s, but led to 
serious macroeconomic imbalances in the 1990s, disrupting growth. Quality of 
spending has been a major problem as well, with low priority to human development 
and essential infrastructure. These factors have contributed to a stagnation in the 
progress with poverty reduction during the 1990s. Low spending on human 
development along with poor service delivery have resulted in very slow 
improvement in human development indicators in Pakistan overall, making it a 
negative outlier in terms of poor human indicators relative to countries with similar 
per capita income levels. Weak management of the budget in turn reflect a number of 
major institutional constraints relating to debt management, tax administration, 
expenditure planning, assignment of responsibilities by levels of government, 
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Half-hearted attempts to improve fiscal management in the 1990s met with 
limited success. While the fiscal deficit was significantly reduced, defense spending 
was cut and spending on health and education was increased, the reform efforts fell 
short of securing a strategic improvement in Budget as an instrument for growth and 
poverty reduction. However, since the advent of the military government in 1999, 
there has been a more systematic and comprehensive effort to address many of the 
institutional constraints to improved budgetary management. The strategic objective 
of the reforms, underpinned by a PRS, is to restore the growth momentum, reduce 
poverty and improve human development. Debt management has received 
considerable attention, including further reduction in fiscal deficit and reduction in 
cost of borrowing. A debt management unit has been set up to monitor debt and 
ensure consistency with fiscal policy. Importantly, legislation is planned to enact a 
Fiscal Responsibility and Debt Reduction law. These are laudable efforts. While a 
Fiscal Responsibility Law by itself does not necessarily guarantee fiscal discipline, 
having such a legal cover can be a powerful instrument in the hands of a reform 
minded finance minister. The debt management unit, similarly, can be a very helpful 
resource for ensuring financial prudence, provided the unit is adequately equipped to 
do the needful monitoring and analysis which then is fed in the budget process. The 
experience so far suggests that there is still a way to go in this area. 
Despite some important positive developments, overall progress on tax 
administration has been slow due to many anti-reform powerful lobbies and 
opposition of vested interest. One example of this is the weak progress with the 
implementation of agricultural income taxation. While the appointment of a strong 
tax administration team is very important, this alone is not enough. Without strong 
political support and adequate autonomy to the tax department, progress will be 
constrained. Also attention needs to be given to strengthening tax administration at 
the provincial and local levels. 
Setting of expenditure priorities to reflect the government’s commitment to 
growth and poverty reduction has been partly constrained by prior claims on the 
budget from debt servicing and defense. With the reduction in the debt burden as 
well as the cost of borrowing, the interest cost of the budget has shown a downward 
trend after more than 30 years. Also, efforts to contain defense spending started in 
the 1990s has been maintained. These developments have helped create some fiscal 
space to finance poverty and growth related programmes. The effective use of this 
fiscal space for growth and poverty programmes will remain a major challenge 
moving forward. Strong efforts will be needed to resist any attempts to blow up this 
fiscal space in extravagant or non-development schemes as in the past. 
The assignment of expenditure accountability by levels of government has 
progressed well, especially with the establishment of the local government. The 
formal establishment of the local government is indeed a major step forward. 
However, as is well-known, decentralising expenditure responsibilities by itself will Sadiq Ahmed  370
not necessarily lead to better service delivery. Other reforms needed include 
financial solvency and autonomy of local governments, ensuring that these 
governments have adequate capacity, establishing a system of accountability 
between beneficiaries, service providers and local governments, establishing 
performance monitoring and evaluation system, and oversight of the higher levels of 
government. Progress in these areas is less clear and the experience is still evolving. 
This remains a major challenge for Pakistan. 
Regarding public expenditure management, efforts underway to prepare a 
Medium-Term Budgetary Framework is a welcome development along with the 
DFID technical assistance. The strategic content to the MTBF is provided by the 
PRS, which is also moving along. The implementation of the MTBF, however, has 
been rather slow. International experience suggests that this can be a powerful tool to 
improve the effectiveness of public spending provided it is well implemented. This 
requires a serious effort, including enhancing the capacity of the Ministry of Finance 
and other line ministries to undertake this exercise, especially regarding ability to 
link the MTBF to the PRS, and update this as necessary. The underlying data needs 
(e.g. costing of sectoral programmes) are quite substantial. 
The effort to improve monitoring and evaluation as a part of the PRS is a 
positive development, although progress is rather slow. M&E needs are substantial 
and required at all levels of government. Indeed, M&E at the district level will be the 
key to ensuring availability of reliable and adequate indicators of progress with 
stated outcomes. This is a major challenge as capacities at the local level are weak. 
Finally, despite recent progress with financial management, there remains a 
long-term agenda for strengthening financial management and accountability, 
especially at the local levels. Establishing adequate oversight of parliamentary 
committees and follow-up to the recommended actions are particularly important. 
 
REFERENCES 
Ahmed, Sadiq (1994) Explaining Pakistan’s High Growth Performance over the Past 
Two Decades: Can it be Sustained? World Bank, Washington, D. C. (Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 1341.) 
Ahmed, Sadiq (2002) The Political Economy of Poverty Reduction in South Asia: 
Role of Good Governance. World Bank, Washington, D. C. (South Asia Region 
Internal Discussion Paper No. 181.) 
Ahmed, Sadiq (2002) The Politics of Reforms in South Asia. World Bank, 
Washington, D. C. (South Asia Region Internal Discussion Paper No. 184.) 
Ahmed, Sadiq, and Anwar Shah (1995) Fiscal Decentralisation in Pakistan. 
Washington, D. C.: South Asia Region, World Bank.  
Easterly, William (2001) Pakistan’s Critical Constraint: Not the Financing Gap but 
the Social Gap. Background Paper for Pakistan Poverty Assessment, 2002, World 
Bank, Washington, D. C. Budgetary Reform, Growth, and Poverty  371
Hasan, Parvez (1998) Pakistan’s Economy at the Crossroads-Past Policies and 
Present Imperatives. Karachi: Oxford University Press. 
Hussain, Ishrat (1999) Pakistan: The Economy of an Elitist State. Karachi: Oxford 
University Press. 
Pakistan, Government of (2001) Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP). 
Jointly prepared by the Ministry of Finance and the Planning Commission, 
November, Islamabad. 
Pakistan, Government of (2001) Reform of Tax Administration in Pakistan. Report 
of the Task Force on Reform of Tax Administration, April, Islamabad. 
World Bank (1997) The State in a Changing World. World Development Report 
1997. New York: Oxford University Press. 
World Bank (2001) Building Institutions for Markets. World Development Report 
2002. New York: Oxford University Press. 
World Bank (2002) Sustainable Development. World Development Report 2003. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
World Bank (2002a) Pakistan Development Policy Review—A New Dawn? (Report 
Number 23916-PAK.) 
World Bank (2002b) Pakistan Poverty Assessment. Washington, D. C. (Report 
Number 24296-PAK.) 
World Bank (2002c) Pakistan Country Financial Accountability Assessment, Part 1. 
Washington, D. C. 
World Bank (2003) Pakistan Public Expenditure Management. Washington, D. C. 
(Report Number 25665-PK.) 
World Bank (2003a) Making Services Work for the Poor People. World 
Development  Report 2004. New York: Oxford University Press. 
World Bank (2003b) Pakistan Country Financial Accountability Assessment. 





The paper by Sadiq Ahmed focuses on budget as a core institution and on its 
impact on poverty reduction through provision of services and targeted programmes. 
The paper examines the need for reforms in the institutional dimensions of budget to 
make it more effective for poverty reduction. The paper concludes that the 
management of budget, lack of quality in spending, and half-hearted attempts to deal 
with the problem of fiscal deficits indicate a need for greater and improved efforts. 
The study is interesting and useful. However, for more comprehensive coverage, the 
study should also include the discussion on the following issues. 
  (1) The study seems to suggest that budget deficit is bad. Is it always the case? 
If not, then what are the reasons that it is becoming a critical issue for 
Pakistan. 
  (2) The debt situation is highlighted as the major problem facing Pakistan’s 
economy. However, instead of comparing the amount of debt, it will be 
more meaningful to compare the NPV of debt. 
  (3) Introduction of fiscal responsibility bill should be considered only if its 
implications are fully worked out. 
  (4) For tax reforms, improving tax collection is a critical issue. It can result in 
a substantial increase in revenue if the large tax-payers are evading taxes. 
Therefore, the issue of improving governance may be more critical than the 
issue of enlargement of the base. Furthermore, effective implementation of 
agricultural income tax may result in substantial revenue gains. 
  (5) The introduction of medium term budgeting (for revenue and expenditure), 
new accounting framework based on accrual are important policy reforms. 
The implications of these reforms should be highlighted. 
  (6) General data availability and reconciliation of data from various sources 
are critical issues. The fiscal reforms package must include this aspect. It 
will help to reduce the discretionary elements in the budgets. 
  (7) The reforms are undertaken in other areas of the economy. The inter-
linkages between these reform programmes should not be ignored 
particularly if the issues of sequencing of reforms needs to be examined. 
  (8) The emphasis of the paper is on revenue collection and reforms. The 
expenditure side of the budget is not given sufficient attention. In order to 
examine the impact on poverty the expenditure side of the budget may be 




Keeping in view the importance of the topic and the need for research in this 
important area, this paper is a useful starting-point. 
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